

Responses to Queries on IM

Disclaimer: Below responses will be further clarified / explained (if required) during information session (16th Feb 2026), Bidder Seminar (4th March 2026) and Mock Auction (5th March 2026).

Sr.	Queries	PTA Response
1	<p>Minimum bid levels: Section 2.2.1 of the IM states that the auction will have minimum bid levels and that the minimum bid level for a Qualified Bidder qualified as an incumbent (existing) operator will be 5 lots of 2600 MHz spectrum and 5 lots of 3500 MHz spectrum. However, the IM states that minimum bid levels are quantity restrictions “that a bidder can bid for in the first round of the auction.” (emphasis added). Therefore, in the first round of the auction is it valid for a Qualified Bidder (incumbent operator) to submit a bid of 0 for either 2600 MHz or 3500 MHz or must a Qualified Bidder that is an incumbent operator submit bids of at least 5 lots for both 2600 MHz and 3500 MHz?</p>	<p>It is not valid for an incumbent bidder to submit a bid for less than 5 lots in either 2600 MHz or 3500 MHz in the first round.</p> <p>A valid set of bids must include at least 5 lots at 2600 MHz AND 5 lots at 3500 MHz, for a bidder who qualified as an incumbent bidder.</p> <p>If a bidder fails to submit a valid set of bids in Round 1, it will be deemed to have submitted a bid for zero lots across all lot categories. In this case, pre-bid deposit money of such bidder will be forfeited in full, and it will be excluded from further participation in the auction.</p>
2	<p>Bid prices: Section 5.1.2.c of the IM states that in rounds after round 1, bids may be between the Opening Price and the Clock Price. For bids other than “maintain bids,” are any bid prices between the Opening Price and the Clock Price, rounded to the nearest \$1, valid?</p>	<p>All bid prices are rounded to the nearest \$1,000. The auction system will block bid prices that are not in multiples of \$1,000. For further clarification, please see response of Q3 below.</p>
3	<p>Bid prices: For bids other than “maintain bids” are the Opening Price and the Clock Price valid bid prices? Consider the following example: suppose in round $r > 1$ the opening price for a product is \$10,000,000 and the clock price is \$12,000,000. Are all the following dollar amounts valid bid prices for either an increase bid or a decrease bid?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$10,000,000 • \$10,000,001 • \$10,500,000 • \$11,000,000 • \$11,999,998 • \$11,999,999 • \$12,000,000 	<p>All bid prices are rounded to the nearest \$1,000. The auction system will block submission of bid prices that are not in multiples of \$1,000.</p> <p>If you attempt to input bids that are not a rounded number, the software will propose a valid bid number rounded to the nearest \$1,000. e.g. \$10,000,001 will be rounded to \$10,000,000 \$11,999,998 or \$11,999,999 will be rounded to \$12,000,000.</p>

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4	<p>Bid prices (maintain bids): Please confirm whether bids to maintain position may only be submitted at the Clock Price.</p>	Yes, correct.
5	<p>Bid processing (spectrum cap): Section 5.2.1.e.4 lists the bid processing algorithm for an increase bid request. Please note that the algorithm does not explicitly state that bids will only be processed that do not violate the spectrum caps (see Section 2.2.1.a). Please confirm that increase bid requests will only be processed if they do not violate the spectrum caps.</p> <p>Please confirm whether 5.2.1.e.4.a should read “If the increase in quantity can be accepted without violating the activity rules or the spectrum caps, the bid is processed in full”.</p>	<p>Spectrum caps are enforced at the point of bid entry. The activity rule prevents spectrum caps from being violated during any iteration of the bid processing algorithm.</p> <p>Paragraph 5.2.1.e.4.a could alternatively be written “If the increase in quantity can be accepted without violating the activity rules <u>AND without violating</u> the spectrum caps, the bid is processed in full” without changing the rules.</p>
6	<p>Bid processing (after round 1): Section 5.2.1.e.5 states “If a bid is not processed or is only partially processed, then the processing algorithm within the EAS will move on to the next bid in the queue.” This same paragraph then states that bids or portions of bids returned to the queue may be “repeatedly reprocessed” as part of the functioning of the bid queue. Moreover, Section 5.2.1.e.6 states that “Bid processing continues until there are either no bids remaining in the queue or all remaining bids cannot be processed.” (Emphasis added). Please confirm that the algorithm always re-tests the bid queue (from the lowest price point in the queue) if any bid is either fully or partially processed.</p>	Correct. The bid processing algorithm re-tests the bid queue in order of price points (lowest price point first) at each iteration.

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7	<p>Processed price determination: Section 5.2.1.e.7.c of the IM states that “if one or more Decrease Bids were fully or partially rejected, then the Processed price will be set equal to the lowest price at which any part of a Decrease bid was rejected.” (Emphasis added). Please confirm that what is meant is the following: If, for the product category in question, at least one bid to reduce demand was processed either fully or partially and demand for that product equals supply, then the Processed price equals the highest bid price of bids to reduce demand for the product that were either fully or partially applied.</p>	<p>If, for the product category in question, at least one bid to reduce demand was processed either fully or partially and demand for that product equals supply, then the Processed price equals the highest bid price of bids to reduce demand for the product that were either fully or partially applied.</p> <p>Above will be reflected in the final IM.</p>
8	<p>Process: What is the minimum gap between the end of the allocation stage and the start of the assignment stage?</p>	<p>There will be a minimum of 1 clear business day between the end of allocation stage and start of assignment stage.</p>
9	<p>Activity Rule and minimum activity requirement: Section 5.2.1.d.i.5 defines the Activity Rule that applies after Round 1. This rule does not define a minimum activity requirement, which is a percentage of points on which one must be active to maintain eligibility. In ascending clock auctions, this percentage is typically between 80% and 95%, although it can increase as the auction progresses. Please confirm whether the auction will have a minimum required activity and whether PTA has considered suitable ranges.</p>	<p>The term “activity requirement” is not an official term for the purposes of this auction. See also response to Q10 below.</p>
10	<p>Activity Rule and minimum activity requirement: Section 5.2.1.d.i.5.c states that bidder eligibility will, after each round, equal processed activity. This seems to indicate that PTA has decided to implicitly set a minimum required activity of 100% throughout the duration of the auction, which is atypical for an ascending clock auction</p>	<p>The term “activity requirement” is not an official term for the purposes of this auction.</p> <p>We are aware that activity requirements less than 100% have been used in some other auctions using this format. This is often in cases where spectrum is sold on a regional basis. It is less</p>

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	with many products of varying eligibility points. Please confirm whether this is PTA's intent.	<p>common in situations where all spectrum blocks are sold on a national basis, as in this auction.</p> <p>In this auction, a bidder's Eligibility will decrease if it submits a set of bids with less activity than it's current Eligibility and the decrease is processed.</p>
11	<p>Assignment phase: Please provide auction rules with details on the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What constitutes a bid in round 1? What constitutes a bid in round > 1? 2. If the auction is conducted similarly to the process outlined for the Allocation Stage, how are prices defined? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Are prices defined as incremental to Allocation Stage prices? ○ Are prices defined as totals, including Allocation Stage prices? ○ What is the price increment PTA plans to use? 3. How are requests to switch position processed within a product? 4. Within a single round may a bidder place multiple requests to move position multiple times? 5. May a bidder submit a bid request at (potentially) any number of different prices as in the Allocation Stage? 6. What is the price a winning bidder pays (i.e. what is the pricing rule)? 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The assignment stage determines assignment prices, which are additional to the allocation prices (determined at allocation stage). A bid in any round of the assignment stage is a commitment to pay the bid price for a specific position within the band. 2. Assignment prices are additional to allocation prices. The opening prices for all positions are \$0. An increment schedule will be communicated to qualified bidders ahead of the assignment round. 3. Requests to switch position within a band are processed in the same way as requests to switch demand are processed in allocation stage. If a bidder wants to switch from bottom to middle position, it must submit a decrease bid for bottom position and an increase bid for middle position. 4. A bidder can only request to switch into one position in a given round. 5. Bid prices (for decrease bids and increase bids) must be in the interval between opening price and clock price for that round. This rule is the same as for the allocation stage. 6. The assignment stage uses the same pricing rule as the allocation stage.

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12	<p>Assignment Stage: Consider the following example. Suppose in the 2600 MHz band, we have following allocation phase results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bidder A: 80 MHz, Bidder B: 60 MHz, Bidder C: 50 MHz. • Please confirm the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ All bidders will have only 3 assignment options that correspond to bottom, middle, and top placement in the band. ○ For each bidder, the exact frequencies of a middle placement will depend on outcome of the other two bidders (i.e. which gets top vs. bottom) since they have different quantities. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ For example, if Bidder A is on the bottom, Bidder C's middle assignment would be 2580 - 2630 MHz, whereas if Bidder B is on the bottom, Bidder C's middle assignment is 2560 - 2610 MHz. ▪ Therefore, please confirm that any bidder bidding for “middle” does not know the frequencies with would be bidding for. 	<p>In this example, the assignment stage will comprise 3 categories (bottom, middle and top), with 1 lot in each category.</p> <p>It is correct that the winner of the middle position will not know its specific frequencies, as this will depend on which bidder wins the bottom position.</p>
13	<p>Kindly confirm whether, at the Application Stage, an Applicant is required only to apply for participation in the auction, or whether any indicative intent regarding specific spectrum bands or quantities is also required at this stage.</p>	<p>An applicant is not required to specify indicative demand for specific frequency bands at the Application Stage. However, the submission of the formal application, along with the requisite pre-bid deposit, indicates that the applicant has committed minimum of 50 MHz in each of the 2600 MHz and 3500 MHz bands</p>

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14	Will the PTA please make available a file capable of being opened in Excel which contains all relevant previous and current round information.	The EAS allows for download of round results in csv format, which can be opened in Excel. Sample files will be distributed to Qualified Bidders.
15	There is a risk with the auction design that bidders become stranded on uneconomic quantities of spectrum as they seek to arbitrage between bands. In order to reduce the risk of an inefficient outcome, can the PTA incorporate a trading window or some alternative feature that would allow bidders to rationalise post auction spectrum holdings to avoid uneconomic small holdings prior to the assignment stage.	A trading window is not incorporated into the auction design.
16	IM suggests PTA could make information on specific frequencies won at the allocation stage but the allocation stage only relates to generic lots, please clarify?	The allocation stage concerns generic lots. However, for the case where a single bidder wins all lots in a band during allocation stage, the specific frequencies are known (and no assignment round for such a band is required).
17	The section indicates that every bidder is entitled to two round extensions. The glossary in section 9.2 defines an Extension Right as the right to extending 3 rounds. Which statement is correct?	Each bidder has two Extension Rights. The glossary will be corrected in the final IM.
18	Please describe what information will be available on the electronic bidding system, for example, will historic levels of excess demand by band be displayed?	<p>After the completion of each Round (except the Final Round), the EAS will provide the following information to each bidder:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i) The bidder's own Processed Quantity in each category; ii) The Processed Price in each category; iii) Aggregate demand and excess demand in each category; iv) The next round Opening Price and Clock Price for each category; and v) The start and end time for the next Round. <p>All round results (for historic rounds) remain available in the EAS throughout the auction. Round results can be downloaded in csv format.</p>

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19	Can you please provide a more detailed explanation of the Assignment Stage and a worked example	Worked examples for both allocation stage and assignment stage will be provided at the Information Session for Prospective Applicants.
20	The spectrum cap in this section is defined as '348.5 MHz for all IMT spectrum holdings (including existing spectrum and spectrum acquired in the auction). This corresponds to 40% of total spectrum available post auction'. Will the spectrum cap remain at 348.5MHz in the event of any unsold spectrum?	The spectrum caps apply throughout the auction, regardless of any unsold lots. Spectrum caps after the auction is complete are a separate policy issue.
21	The IM states that eligibility is set as 1 point per MHz (similar to the statement related to the Reserve Price). In Table 6, Eligibility is calculated on the basis of the total amount of spectrum in the lot, for example, 2 x 5 MHz generates eligibility for the lot of 10 points whereas for the reserve price, only 5 MHz is used to determine the reserve price for the lot. Please clarify whether the eligibility calculation or the reserve price calculation is the correct interpretation of sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2?	In all bands except 1800 MHz, eligibility is set at 1 point per MHz, so a 2x5 MHz lot has 10 points. To facilitate comparison with auction prices for past auctions, the IM provides information about the reserve prices for paired spectrum based on a reserve price for 2x1 MHz. A reserve price for a 2x5 MHz lot is five times the reserve for 2x1 MHz for than category.
22	Please clarify whether minimum spectrum acquisition requirements apply per allocation stage or only at final auction outcome?	There is no minimum spectrum acquisition requirement in any band. There are minimum bid requirements for incumbent bidders in the 2600 MHz and 3500 MHz bands, which apply in round 1 of the allocation stage only. It is possible that a bidder could win a subset of its minimum quantity demanded at 2600 MHz or 3500 MHz in round 1 or any subsequent round if there is competition (excess demand).

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23	Clarify consequences if an incumbent fail to acquire the mandatory minimum 50 MHz in 2600 MHz or 3500 MHz bands.	There is no mandatory minimum allocation in any band. There are minimum bid requirements for incumbent bidders in the 2600 MHz and 3500 MHz bands, which apply in round 1 of the allocation stage only. It is possible that a bidder could win a subset of its minimum quantity demanded at 2600 MHz or 3500 MHz in round 1 or any subsequent round if there is competition (excess demand).
24	At the Application Stage, is an applicant required only to apply for participation in the auction, or is any indicative intent regarding specific spectrum bands and/or quantities also required?	An applicant is not required to specify indicative demand for specific frequency bands at the Application Stage. However, the submission of the formal application, along with the requisite pre-bid deposit, indicates that the applicant has committed minimum of 50 MHz in each of the 2600 MHz and 3500 MHz bands.
25	If an applicant indicates intent for the minimum bid (i.e., 50 MHz in both the 2600 MHz and 3500 MHz bands) at the application stage, will the applicant still be eligible to bid for spectrum in other bands during the auction?	Further to response of Q24 above, it is explained that in round 1 of the Allocation Stage, a bidder may place bids for any spectrum band across all available bands. Notwithstanding the foregoing, bidding for a minimum of 50 MHz in each of the 2600 MHz and 3500 MHz bands shall be mandatory in round.
26	To ensure correct understanding of the allocation stage mechanics, please provide one or more worked examples covering a complete allocation stage across multiple rounds. The examples should include step-by-step details on bid processing and the determination of the Processed Price.	Worked examples will be provided at the Information Session for Prospective Applicants.

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27	Consider the following scenario: In the Allocation Stage, if there is an excess demand after Round 1 and the auction proceeds to Round 2 with a price increase, an operator may, due to the price increase, decide to reduce demand by two lots in the 2600 MHz band while simultaneously increasing demand by two lots in the 3500 MHz band. Please clarify whether both actions (i.e., decrease bid in 2600 MHz band and increase bid in 3500 MHz band) can be submitted simultaneously in a round, or decrease bid in the 2600 MHz band must be submitted and processed first, followed by increase bid request submission in the 3500 MHz band in next round.	<p>In this example, the decrease bid in 2600 MHz and the increase bid in 3500 MHz can be submitted simultaneously (in Round 2).</p> <p>The decrease bid in 2600 MHz may be processed (if there is sufficient excess demand). If the decrease bid is processed, the increase bid in 3500 MHz will be processed.</p>
28	Will PTA guarantee physically contiguous spectrum blocks for each winning bidder in each band, or could fragmentation occur depending on assignment outcomes? Additionally, clarify how PTA will ensure contiguous spectrum blocks during the assignment stage and whether block sizes are predefined or dynamically created based on allocation results.	All spectrum awarded in the auction will be awarded as contiguous block for each winning bidder. In the assignment stage, bidders are bidding for relative positions within each band. Bid options at the assignment stage are determined by the outcome of the allocation stage.
29	Section 5.2.1(c) refers to “Bid Prices for Subsequent Rounds.” Please clarify the required denomination for bid prices in subsequent rounds. Specifically, will bid prices be specified in whole dollars, or must they be submitted in defined multiples (for example, USD 10, USD 100, or USD 1,000)?	All bid prices are multiples of \$1,000
30	In Section 5.2.1(e)(ii)(3)(b)(ii), as subsection (b) addresses decreases in quantity, item (ii) appears to incorrectly refer to an “increase.” The sentence currently	Paragraph may be read as <i>“If no part of the decrease in quantity can be accepted without causing aggregate demand to fall below supply, then no part of the decrease is processed.”</i>

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	<p>reads: <i>“If no part of the increase in quantity can be accepted without causing aggregate demand to fall below supply, then no part of the decrease is processed.”</i></p> <p>Please confirm whether the first reference should instead be to a decrease, such that the sentence would read: <i>“If no part of the decrease in quantity can be accepted without causing aggregate demand to fall below supply, then no part of the decrease is processed.”</i></p>	<p>This will be reflected in the final IM.</p>
31	<p>In the bid processing description at Section 5.2.1(e)(ii)(5), the rules state: <i>“If a bid is not processed or is only partially processed, then the processing algorithm within the EAS will move on to the next bid in the queue. The unprocessed bid or unprocessed part of a bid is returned to the top of the queue.”</i></p> <p>Please clarify how this rule is intended to operate in the case where a bid is partially processed. In particular, it appears that under the current wording, the algorithm would proceed directly to the next bid in the queue, rather than re-testing earlier bids after partial processing.</p> <p>For example (single band for simplicity): Bidder A: -1 @ 10% Bidder B: +2 @ 20% Bidder C: -1 @ 30%</p> <p>Suppose Bidder A’s decrease at 10% cannot be processed, and Bidder B’s increase at 20% is only partially processed.¹ Under the current wording, the</p>	<p>All bids that have been fully processed get eliminated from the queue. All bids that have been partly processed stay in the queue (in the same order) with the remaining unprocessed part of the bid. All bids that have not been processed stay in the queue (in the same order).</p> <p>Whenever a bid has been fully or partially processed, the algorithm re-starts from the top of the queue.</p> <p>In the concrete example: Bidder A’s decrease bid cannot be processed. The algorithm moves on to Bidder B’s increase bid, which can be partially processed. The algorithm would then start from the top of the queue and test if Bidder A’s decrease bid can be processed.</p> <p>This will be clarified in the final IM. It will also be covered by worked examples in the Information Session for Prospective Applicants.</p>

¹ It is noted that partial processing of B’s bid to increase demand in the example requires successful processing of a decrease by Bidder B in another band. We assume that this is the case and abstract away from this detail in this example.

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	<p>algorithm would then proceed to Bidder C's decrease at 30% and process it. However, it may be expected that after partial processing of Bidder B's bid, the queue should be re-tested from the beginning, such that Bidder A's lower-priced decrease bid is reconsidered before moving further down the queue.</p> <p>In the reference spectrum auctions cited in Section 5.1.4, the bid processing description reflects a re-testing mechanism after partial processing, whereby the queue of (partially) unprocessed bids is revisited before proceeding to the next bid in the queue (FCC p. 13-14 (5.3), ACMA p.50 (4.2.1.7); Ofcom p.60 (A6.66); ISED p.110 (39.)).</p> <p>Please confirm whether the mechanism described in Section 5.2.1(e)(ii) is intended to be equivalent to this re-testing approach. If not, we would appreciate multiple worked examples illustrating bid processing under the intended EAS rules, including scenarios where bids are partially processed.</p>	
32	<p>Additionally, in the bid processing description at Section 5.2.1(e)(ii)(5), the rules state:</p> <p><i>“The unprocessed bid or unprocessed part of a bid is returned to the top of the queue.”</i></p> <p>Please clarify how “returned to the top of the queue” should be understood in operational terms. In particular, this wording appears to imply that (partially) unprocessed bids may be moved ahead of other bids in the queue,</p>	<p>All unprocessed bids retain their order in the queue. This will be clarified in the final IM. It will also be covered by worked examples in the Information Session for Prospective Applicants.</p>

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	<p>potentially altering the queue’s ordering by price point during processing (i.e., the queue may no longer remain sorted in ascending order of price point). This would be unusual relative to the reference spectrum auctions cited in Section 5.1.4, where unprocessed bids (or unprocessed parts of bids) typically remain in the queue in their existing position, and the queue is re-tested without re-ordering.</p> <p>Could you please confirm whether the queue is intended to remain ordered by price point throughout processing (with re-testing), or whether the EAS algorithm intentionally re-orders bids by moving unprocessed bids/parts to the top? If the latter, we would appreciate multiple worked examples illustrating bid processing under this rule, including cases involving partial processing.</p>	
33	<p>We note a scenario that does not appear to be covered by the Processed Price definition in Section 5.2.1(e)(ii)(7)(a)-(c). Specifically, where:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. the round begins with excess demand (so (a) does not apply), b. after bid processing, aggregate demand is equal to supply at the clock price (so (b) does not apply), and c. no Decrease Bid was fully or partially rejected (so (c) does not apply), i.e., where the final (accepted) Decrease Bid reduces aggregate demand to exactly supply, with no rejected decreases. 	<p>In the example, the Posted Price will be set by Bidder A’s Bid Price for the Decrease Bid. This is the highest price at which there is excess demand.</p> <p>The pricing rule will be clarified in the final IM.</p>

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	<p>Consider this situation for example:</p> <p><i>Suppose that excess demand is 1 in a band and the following bid is submitted for the band:</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Bidder A: -1 @ 30% (accepted)</i></p> <p>Please clarify what the Processed Price is intended to be in this case. If necessary, we suggest that the rules include an explicit additional sub-paragraph to cover this scenario.</p>	
34	<p>Section 5.2.1(e)(ii)(7)(a) states: <i>“If aggregate demand was less than or equal to supply in the previous round and remains less than or equal to supply in the current round, the Processed Price will be the Opening Price.”</i></p> <p>We are concerned that this rule may produce unintended outcomes in cases where aggregate demand begins at supply (so (a) applies), bid processing nevertheless occurs (including at higher price points), and the round ends with aggregate demand again equal to supply (potentially with a different bidder-to-lot mapping). In such cases, the rules appear to imply that the Processed Price remains the Opening Price, even though bids at higher nominated prices were accepted and (subsequently) decreases were submitted in response to those higher prices.</p>	<p>In the example, the Posted Price will be set by Bidder B’s Bid Price for the Decrease Bid. This is the highest price at which there is excess demand.</p> <p>The pricing rule will be clarified in the final IM.</p>

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	<p>For example, suppose that in a band with zero excess demand in the previous round, the following bids are placed:</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Bidder A: +1 @ 10% accepted²</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Bidder B: -1 @ 20% accepted</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Bidder C: -1 @ 30% rejected</i></p> <p>In this example, applying part (a) mechanically would imply that the Processed Price remains equal to the Opening Price. This appears inconsistent with the economic interpretation of the processed price and would be unusual relative to comparator ESMRA implementations.</p> <p>Could you please clarify the intended Processed Price definition for this scenario, and confirm whether part (a) is intended to apply even where bids at higher bid prices are accepted/rejected during processing? If part (a) is not intended to cover such cases, we suggest refining the rule to ensure the Processed Price reflects the relevant nominated prices actually applied during the processing step. We would also appreciate a worked example demonstrating the intended pricing outcome for this case.</p>	

² It is noted that processing of A's bid to increase demand in the example requires successful processing of a decrease by A in another band. We assume that this is the case and abstract away from this detail in this example.

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35	The information provided on the assignment stage is fairly minimal. Please provide at least one worked example of how bidding and price determination in the assignment will proceed. Please provide at least one example where the assignment stage extends over multiple rounds.	Worked examples of the Assignment Stage will be provided at the Information Session for Prospective Applicants
36	In the 3500 MHz band, any unallocated lots shall be assigned to the top of the band. Please confirm that "top of the band" in this context means assigning unsold spectrum starting from 3300 MHz? We propose that any unsold lots in 3500MHz band should be positioned from 3300MHz up.	Please refer to clause 6.4.3(b) of the IM. It is further explained that "top of the band" is the highest available frequencies within a band. For 3500 MHz, this means frequencies just below 3580 MHz.
37	Moreover, for other TDD bands offered in the auction, particularly 2300 MHz and 2600 MHz, please clarify how any unallocated lots (if any) will be positioned during the Assignment Stage? Please confirm whether the positioning of such unallocated lots will be fixed (i.e., determined by PTA prior to Assignment Stage), to ensure predictability and allow bidders to accurately assess assignment outcomes.	Refer to clause 6.2 of the IM.
38	How does PTA expect to set increments/clock prices in the assignment stage?	Refer to response of query 11 above.
39	Our understanding is that no extension rights will be granted during the assignment stage. Please confirm whether this understanding is correct.	The auction manager (PTA) retains the right to set the duration of bidding rounds and extend bidding rounds as necessary.

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		Bidders have two extension rights by default during the allocation stage. It is correct that bidders do not have extension rights by default during assignment stage.
40	<p>Section 6.5.2 states that bidding at the Assignment Stage is in terms of relative positions within each band, and that where a band has N provisional winners, there will be N different bid options (Rank 1 through Rank N).</p> <p>However, Section 6.4.2 provides that bid options must be compatible not only with all Winning Bidders being assigned contiguous spectrum, but also with any unallocated lots being assigned to a contiguous block.</p> <p>In scenarios where there are unallocated/unsold lots in a band and N winning bidders, this appears to imply that there may be an additional feasible placement for each bidder, depending on where the unallocated contiguous block sits within the band (with an exception in the 3500 MHz band where unallocated lots are automatically assigned to the top of the band).</p> <p>Accordingly, please clarify whether, in bands where unallocated lots need to be positioned (and are not automatically fixed to the top of the band), the number of assignment bid options should be N+1 to reflect the additional possible relative placement created by the unallocated block. If not, please clarify the intended treatment/placement of unallocated lots and how this is</p>	Refer to response of query 11 above.

Responses to Queries on IM

Disclaimer: Below responses will be further clarified / explained (if required) during information session (16th Feb 2026), Bidder Seminar (4th March 2026) and Mock Auction (5th March 2026).

Sr.	Queries	PTA Response
	reconciled with the Rank 1...Rank N framework in Section 6.5.2.	
41	<p>Consider the following scenario: In Round 1, two bidders submit bids for the same rank (e.g., Rank 1), while a third bidder submits a bid for a different rank (e.g., Rank 3), with no competing demand for that rank. Due to excess demand for Rank 1, the Assignment Stage continues to subsequent rounds. In a later round, one of the bidders originally competing for Rank 1 withdraws and submits a bid for Rank 3. Please clarify the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Whether a bidder is permitted to switch to a rank that was previously uncontested in earlier rounds? b. Whether a bidder who was the sole bidder for a rank in earlier rounds is deemed to have any priority or protection over that rank? c. Whether such rank becomes contested again, triggering continued bidding until demand resolves? d. Can two operators simultaneously leave a rank causing the demand on that particular rank to drop to ZERO? <p>When switching ranks in any round, can the bid price on the newly opted rank be lower than the bid price against the previously opted rank in the previous round.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) A bidder can request to switch to any rank, whether this rank was uncontested or not. b) No priority is given to a bidder who bid in an earlier round for a specific rank. c) If a rank was previously uncontested, and the rank receives an increase bid (that is processed), the rank becomes contested. d) Two bidders can request a decrease bid for the same rank, but only one decrease bid will be processed. <p>The processed price for any specific rank can only increase (or remain unchanged). Processed prices are not linked across ranks.</p>
42	Please clarify the contingency and remedial measures in the event that the Electronic Auction System (EAS)	Refer to Section 5.2.5 of the IM, on exceptional circumstances.

Responses to Queries on IM

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Sr.	Queries	PTA Response
	experiences login failure, system outage, or unexpected shutdown during the auction process.	
43	We want to have an online meeting with NERA to get understanding of auction rules, EAS, activities etc during IM consultation phase?	PTA will host a Bidder Seminar, and Mock Auctions, for Qualified Bidders. All such.